Epstein on His Own Grounds

RICHARD H. McADAMS*

Forbidden Grounds fails to follow through on its own terms. Epstein invokes Thomas Hobbes but never considers the Hobbesian
argument for Title VII; employs economic analysis without disclosing its dependence on controversial empirical assumptions; and
makes empirical claims, particularly about social norms, without
applying the standardsof criticism to supporting evidence that he
applies to contrary evidence.
Richard Epstein has a bold thesis. It is not merely that laws banning intentional employment discrimination are, on balance, impru-

dent. Rather, by express statement and general tone Epstein wishes
to deny even that reasonable minds can differ on whether the effect
of Title VII is positive or negative. He says, for example, that "the
only hard questions about the employment discrimination laws concern the types and magnitudes of the social dislocations that result
from their vigorous enforcement."' I believe that Title VII accomplishes a net social good, 2 but I will here pursue a more modest
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RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION LAWS Xii (1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS].
Elsewhere Epstein notes: "Given the efficiency losses . . .of antidiscrimination rules,
very powerful justifications have to be found for one group to announce that another
group's preferences just do not matter .... None of substance is offered." Id. at 305.
"At bottom are only two pure forms of legislation - productive and redistributive. Antidiscrimination legislation is always of the second kind." Id. at 494. "The modern civil
rights laws are a new form of imperialism that threatens the political liberty and intellectual freedom of us all." Id. at 505. Epstein does state, however, that his "critique ...
should . . .pay handsome dividends even if its only consequence is to prod defenders
S.. to strengthen their defense of the antidiscrimination principle." Id. at 7. However, I
found this temperate introductory remark unreflective of the subsequent tone.
2. I outlined an economic argument for prohibiting race discrimination in Richard

claim: that to maintain the vehemence and apparent simplicity of its
argument, Forbidden Grounds carefully avoids or obscures some of
the difficult questions directly raised by its analysis. In important
respects, Epstein has not fairly stated the arguments contrary to his
own position, nor disclosed the degree to which his own sources
sometimes lend support to arguments he seeks to refute. While
scholarly work can be argumentative, and polemical work can be
scholarly, these weaknesses exemplify Epstein's failure in combining
the two.
I offer three examples. The first two concern Epstein's pivotal distinction between "force and fraud," on the one hand, and "a refusal
to deal," on the other. Epstein defends the distinction with a social
contract claim and an economic claim; I argue that he fails to disclose important differences in his position and that of Thomas Hobbes -

one of his favorite social contractarians -

and the degree to

which his economic analysis depends on his claim that transaction
costs in the labor market are minimal. The third example is Epstein's treatment of social norms, where he concludes that norms
cannot perpetuate discrimination in the face of market competition
based on what I argue is a strikingly incomplete review of the empirical literature. In each case, even accepting Epstein's method of
analysis - his judgment for what counts as a winning argument there remain "hard questions" that Epstein fails to explore, much
less resolve.
I.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT CLAIM

Epstein begins with Hobbes. At the very start of Part I: Analytical Foundations, Epstein quotes Hobbes' statement that, in war,
"'Force, and Fraud are

. . .

He thinks
the two cardinal virtues.' ,,3

Hobbes, Locke, and other social contractarians have correctly lo-4
cated the legitimacy of government in the evil of "life without law,"1
which, as Epstein further quotes Hobbes, would consist of "'continual fear, and danger of violent death[,] and the life of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish and short.' "' Lacking a state, individuals would
wastefully expend most of their efforts in life protecting themselves
against the force and fraud of others. Government is necessary to
H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 91-103 (1992). For a more complete argument, see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming
1995).
3. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 (1651)). Epstein also referred to Hobbes several times at the Symposium when

defending his position that government power should be limited to preventing force and
fraud.
4. Id. at 17.
5. Id. (quoting HOBBES, supra note 3, at 62).
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provide protection against the dangerous, or as Epstein says, "law

must control the most lawless." "The control of force was [the]
overriding theme" of "the writers in the social contract tradition,
broadly conceived to cover Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Blackstone. ' 7
All of which leads Epstein to conclude that governmental power is
justified only when it is providing protection against the force or
fraud of this "most lawless" contingent. In particular, Epstein draws
a contrast between the danger posed by force and fraud and that

posed by discrimination:
Recall that in dealing with force, each of us has to be concerned about the
person who bears us the most ill will ....
[In contrast, t]he person who wishes to discriminate against another for
any reason has it in her power only to refuse to do business with him, not to
use force against him. The victim of discrimination, unlike the victim of
force, keeps his initial set of entitlements-life, limb, and possession---even
if he does not realize the gains from trade with a particular person.'

For Epstein, the distinction is crucial. As a mere "refusal to deal,"

discrimination falls beyond the reach of appropriate governmental
power. "It never occurred to any of [the social contract writers],"
Epstein says, "that the private refusal to deal, for whatever reason,
was any threat to the social order." 9
With this characteristically sweeping statement, Epstein invokes

the authority of Hobbes and other great thinkers, appearing to
ground his criticism of discrimination laws within a respected tradition of political philosophy. Of course, invoking a philosophical tradition usually obligates one to acknowledge if not respond to long-

standing criticisms of the tradition, whereas Epstein does not even
allude to the existence of voluminous critical commentary on social

contract theory.10 But setting aside this and other potential objections,11 I will ask only whether Hobbesian theory provides Epstein
6. Id. at 19.

7. Id. at 16.
8. Id. at 29-30.

9. Id. at 16.

10. See for example, the recent comments of political philosopher Russell Hardin:
"Despite enormous appeal on its face, consent is among the most troubled and troubling
notions in all of political philosophy. Contractarian theory has been based on the supposed moral superiority of consent over other principles for making social arrangements
and such theory is a shambles." Russell Hardin, The Morality of Law and Economics,
11 LAW & PHIL. 331, 361 (1992) (citing Russell Hardin, Contractarianism:Wistful
Thinking, 1 CONST. POL. ECON. 35, 35-52 (1990); Russell Hardin, PoliticalObligation,
in THE GOOD POLITY 103-19 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989)).
11. One might demand a precise definition of force and fraud. When discussing
sexual harassment, Epstein tells us that "[tihe common law does not take harassment
lightly," and that "shadowing or following a person" may constitute the tort of invasion

the support he claims.
Perhaps the less important of two reasons for disputing Epstein's
use of Hobbes is that Hobbes would not recognize the minimal state
Epstein constructs from his social contract analysis. Hobbes, after
all, did not speak 2of restraining government, but of creating the
"great Leviathan,"' his central point being that the dangers of the

"state of nature" were so great as to justify a sovereign of nearly
unlimited power.'" Although some Hobbes scholars have sought to
reinterpret or reformulate the argument of Leviathan to justify a
government with some liberal protection of individual rights, they
have rarely if ever reached as far as the vision of Forbidden
Grounds.14 Perhaps Epstein has a new reading of Hobbes; perhaps
Epstein rejects Hobbesianism on the all-important issue of the powers of government. But rather than disclose his position, Epstein fails
even to acknowledge any possible controversy in his invocation of
Hobbes.
Epstein might say that he has merely extracted a severable insight
of privacy. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 352-53. Unlike the examples of battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, he does not claim that this
privacy tort requires any actual or threatened physical contact or harm (or fraud). Id. at
353. But if following or watching people in or from public places constitutes "force," why
is ritual shunning or social ostracism not also "force"? If Epstein's distinction is based on
the claim that discriminators never intend to harm or never succeed in harming their
victims psychologically, then it is quite controversial. Epstein does not address this or any
definitional challenge.
12. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 120 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991).
13. "[T]he Soveraign Power . . .is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to
make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences,
yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his
neighbour, are much worse." Id. at 144-45; see JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 3 (1986) ("Hobbes meant his work to be appreciated as a
philosophical argument for absolute sovereignty. . . ."); GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 23 (1986) (criticizing Hobbes' "arguments that
people would favor unlimited government over limited government.").
14. Kavka offers a Hobbesian justification for a less-than-absolute state, but only
by expressly identifying and rejecting certain of Hobbes' arguments. KAVKA, supra note
13. Even then, the state he justifies is far more powerful than Epstein's, including, for
example, a "guaranteed economic minimum for all citizens." Id. at 210-24. Richard
Tuck, editor of the recent Cambridge University Press edition of Leviathan says that "it
has often proved possible to read Hobbes as a surprisingly liberal author." HOBBES,
supra note 12, at xviii. But his examples of liberality do not approach the Epsteinian
limitations on governmental power, both because the limitations are only theoretical not
actual, and because the sovereign need not respect market outcomes. See, e.g., id. at
xviii-xxii. An exceptional view, and the one example I have found of a reading somewhat
friendly to Epstein's, is Michael Levin, A Hobbesian Minimal State, 11 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF.338 (1982) (arguing that the only legitimate ends of the state is the suppression of
violence). But Levin at least addresses the fact that Hobbes describes what appears to be
an absolute sovereign and concedes that Hobbes would permit the sovereign to use any
means it thought necessary to preserve peace, including restraining the liberty of people
who have not themselves used or threatened force (or fraud). Id. at 340-43. If Epstein
intended to rely on and extend Levin's views, he should first have replied to Kavka's
persuasive criticisms of Levin. See KAVKA, supra note 13, at 223-24.
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of Hobbes - the necessity of governmental power to avoid the war
of all against all - to form an argument that the only legitimate
end of government is to maintain peace. But this claim merely leads
to the second and more serious flaw in his reliance on Hobbes. One
cannot accept Hobbes' claim that the state of nature is perpetual
war and silently disregard the reasons that Hobbes gives for such
war. Hobbes believed that one of the fundamental dangers to peace
is the tendency of individuals to deny others the honor and respect
they generally demand. Since Hobbes gives the sovereign the power
to select any means to maintain peace, 15 one legitimate means must
be to control the manner by which individuals show each other
honor. Thus, even Hobbes' "basic insight" raises a plausible claim
for discrimination laws.
Consider again the chapter of Leviathan to which Epstein refers at
the beginning of his Analytical Foundations.There, Hobbes explains
that one of the three causes of war is competition for honor or glory:
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same
rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervalu'ing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that
have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them
destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell.
First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the
third, for Reputation ....

[T]he third, [causes men to use violence] for

trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in 16their Kindred, their
Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Hobbes repeatedly expresses concern for this cause of conflict. One
ground on which Hobbes distinguishes humans from social animals
like bees and ants (that appear to cooperate even in a state of "nature") is that "men are continually in competition for Honour and
Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst
men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally
Warre ....

"117

15. The sovereign shall "be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defense; and
also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same." HOBBES, supra note 12, at 124.
Even Levin concedes this point. LEVIN, supra note 14, at 340-41.
16. HOBES, supra note 12, at 88. Following this passage is the famous description
of life in a state of nature ("nasty, brutish, and short"), and additional material, that
Epstein also quotes. See FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 17-18.
17. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 119. Elsewhere, Hobbes states: "Competition of
Riches, Honour, Command, or other power enclineth to ...

War ....

Particularly,

competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the

For Hobbes, the sovereign is empowered to do what is necessary to
preserve peace, which in countless ways means not only to punish

those who commit violent acts, but to prevent conditions that are
known to threaten peace. 8 Because one cause of war is competition
for honor and dignity, one necessary function of the state is to control the awarding of honor and dignity to the end of preserving
peace. In specifying the rights of sovereigns, Hobbes states:
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value
other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and
diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that
there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as
have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that
there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution . .

. To the Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of

Honour; and to appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall
hold; and what signes9 of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall
give to one another."

We have certainly ventured a long way from Epstein's conclusion
that "[s]ymbols are, in a sense, too important and too volatile to be
either the subject
of, or the justification for, direct government
20
regulation.
Nor can we possibly accept Epstein's claim that "[i]t never occurred" to Hobbes "that the private refusal to deal, for whatever

reason, was any threat to the social order. ' 21 Hobbes simply does not
make Epstein's critical distinction between force/fraud and refusalsliving, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the
glory of the other." Id. at 70. "[A]lI signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;
insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged .. .
Id. at 107. "[M]an, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can
relish in nothing but what is eminent." Id. at 119; see also HAMPTON, supra note 13, at

66-68, 87-88 (emphasizing role of honor and glory in Hobbes as cause of conflict); Arthur Ripstein, Hobbes on World Government and the World Cup, in HOBBES: WAR

AMONG

NATIONS

(Timo Airaksinen & Martin Bertman eds., 1989) (same); Robert

Shaver, Leviathan, King of the Proud, 1990 HOBBES STUD. 54 (same).

18. The sovereign has the right "to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be
done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the
recovery of the same." HOBBES, supra note 12, at 124. A good example of what the
sovereign might do "before hand" is to prevent violence arising from economic deprivation. Hobbes notes the danger: "[N]eedy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition

. . .

are enclined

. . . to

stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no...

such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle." Id. at 70-71; see also id. at
106. Hobbes later states: "[Wlhereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable
to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity of private
persons; but to be provided for

. . .

by the Lawes of the Common-wealth." Id. at 239.

(Kavka uses these passages in criticizing the argument of Levin discussed in note 14,
supra. KAVKA, supra note 13, at 223.).
19. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 126; see also id. at 65, 68-69.
20. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 499.
21. Id. at 16.
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to-deal. Where Epstein says that an act of "dishonoring" someone is
not force - the victim still retains his "life, limb, and possession" 2
-

Hobbes is keenly interested in the fact that it will predictably

lead to the use of force. Hobbes does not think that dishonor can
occur only from force or fraud, but recognizes that people will resort

to violence for "trifles" if they signify the "undervaluing" of themselves or their "Kindred." 2 3 It is hard to imagine that refusals-to-

deal are categorically less incendiary than "a word, a smile, a different opinion." 24 Were there any doubt, Leviathan specifically lists

means of "dishonoring" others, none of which mention and all of
which encompass far more than force and fraud. For example: "To
employ in counsell, or in action of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe
of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in
the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour." 25 In short,
22. Id. at 30.
23. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 88. Thus, Hobbes would understand W.E.B. DuBois' expression of anger in a passage that must puzzle Epstein, so great is the outrage it
expresses at dishonor of one's "kindred":
I shall forgive the white South much in its final judgment day: I shall forgive
its slavery, for slavery is a world-old habit; I shall forgive the fighting for a
well-lost cause, and for remembering that struggle with tender tears; I shall
forgive its so-called "pride of race," the passion of its hot blood, and even its
dear, old, laughable strutting and posing; but one thing I shall never forgive,
neither in this world nor the world to come: its wanton and continued and
persistent insulting of the black womanhood which it sought and seeks to prostitute to its lust. I cannot forget that it is such Southern gentlemen . . . who
insist upon withholding from my mother and wife and daughter those signs and
appellations of courtesy and respect which elsewhere he withholds only from
bawds and courtesans.
W. E. B. Du Bois, DARKWATER: VOICES FROM WITHIN THE VEIL 172 (1920).
24. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 88.
25. Id. at 65. Of course, when Hobbes refers to employing others "in counsell" or
"action of difficulty," he probably only meant seeking occasional advice or assistance
from others, not the creation of an employment relationship, and certainly not an employment relation in the modern economic sense. But it is equally clear that he meant
that certain means of "dealing" with others bestowed honor on them, while the parallel
refusal to deal with them bestowed dishonor. Other examples confirm Hobbes' sensitivity
to the social meaning of what Epstein calls refusals-to-deal:
To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a
signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to Dishonour.
To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to love,
and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare, then he expects,
is to Dishonour. . ..
To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or which
the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving the Honour
done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To
refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.
Id. at 64 (emphasis added).

Hobbes' work provides considerable reason for thinking that, when
they dishonor, refusals-to-deal are a powerful threat to the social
order.
We arrive then at a respectable and obvious Hobbesian argument
for at least some employment discrimination laws: that to preserve
social peace, members of one race should not be allowed to "dishonor" members of another race by certain acts of discrimination.
We can be certain that Epstein rejects the soundness of this argument. We may speculate that he (1) does not believe acts of discrimination are expressions of dishonor, (2) does not believe that any acts
of dishonoring, or that acts of racial dishonoring, are a serious threat
to social peace, or (3) does not think that the government should
concern itself with the causes of violence (or fraud) but act only to
punish individuals once violence (or fraud) occurs. But nowhere in 26
a
500 page book does he offer an argument for any of these points;
Epstein has begun with Hobbes but failed even to consider the most
obvious Hobbesian argument for the position he attacks.27
Nor would the argument be mooted had Epstein never enshrouded
his claim in Hobbesian theory. For what I have termed the "Hobbesian argument" for Title VII is sufficiently conspicuous and plausible
to have independently merited consideration in what purports to be a
comprehensive argument against such laws. The social order argument is, for example, quite similar to one Richard Posner recently
made against Epstein's view of property rights. Posner noted that the
kind of wealth redistribution Epstein condemns may protect property
rights by "heading off revolution or, less dramatically, violence, by
the have-nots." '2 8 How could Epstein ignore the argument in the con-

26. As to point (1), it is not enough to claim that "the fear of exclusion should lose
some of its sting" once we realize that exclusion is ubiquitous. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 1, at 496 (emphasis added). For Hobbes, and given Epstein's utilitarian approach, for him as well, the relevant question is what people will rather than should feel,
and this statement grudgingly concedes that refusal-to-deals can actually "sting" or dishonor those "refused." As for point (2), Epstein implicitly rejects the possibility that
white violence would return to its pre-Title VII levels if Title VII were repealed but does
not explain this view, see infra note 56, nor discuss the possible reaction by minorities or
women to the social meaning of such a repeal. Nor does Epstein argue the final point; a
consequentialist argument for categorically barring government action to prevent violence would, to say the least, be a complex one.
27. In a similar vein, George Rutherglen has noted that Epstein disregards the
most plausible Lockean argument for antidiscrimination laws. See George Rutherglen,
Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1469 (1992) (reviewing FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS, supra note 1) (slavery represents "the best possible claim .. .of a taking
without just compensation" yet Epstein "dismisses all questions of rectification at the
outset with the assertion that 'there is no adequate remedy' for such historical
injustices.").
28.

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 323 (1990).
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text of Title VII? I can hardly believe that this country's long history of violent racial disturbances 29 does not demonstrate a serious
threat to social peace from private acts of racial dishonoring. Certainly, other observers have made this inference, believing that the
Civil Rights Acts were needed at the time to forestall further violence. 30 Given today's racial climate, one can only wonder how Epstein thinks he can sustain his utilitarian argument for repeal of
Title VII without addressing the prospect of social unrest that official indifference to discrimination would likely cause.
Let me reiterate that my point here is not to prove definitively that
this claim refutes Epstein's thesis, resolving the factual and predictive questions the claim raises, but only to note that such factual and
predictive questions remain to be discussed. Without addressing all
the arguable gains from Title VII, Epstein can scarcely sustain his
view that "the only hard questions" concern how negative the effects
are.
II. THE ECONOMIC CLAIM
Now I wish to turn to the second basis of Epstein's distinction
between force/fraud and refusals-to-deal. Epstein makes an economic claim that under most circumstances, a refusal to deal in the
labor market need not harm its victims. Unlike the victim of force,
the victim of discrimination need devote
[n]o resources ... to self-defense .... Instead, the victim can unilaterally ...seek out those persons who wish to make the most favorable transactions with him. Thus, in a world in which 90 percent of the people are
opposed to doing business with me, I shall concentrate my attention on doing business with the other 10 percent, . . . my enemies [being legally]
powerless to block our mutually beneficial transactions by their use of force.
The universe of potential trading partners is surely smaller because some
people bear me personal animus and hostility .... But the critical question for 3my welfare is not which opportunities are lost but which are
retained. 1
29.

See, e.g., READING RODNEY KING READING URBAN UPRISING (Robert Good-

ing-Williams ed., 1993); 9 RACE.
RACIAL

VIOLENCE,

AND

LAW

LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY

(Paul Finkelman ed., 1992);

1700-1990:

DAVID

M.

LYNCHING,
CHALMERS,

HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN (1965).
30. See, e.g., HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY:

19541980, at 156 (1981) (President Kennedy had to push civil rights legislation in 1963 "to
dampen the explosive potential of widespread racial violence and to maintain the confidence of the mass of blacks in government."); see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 808 (1988); GODFREY HODGSON,
AMERICA IN OUR TIME 158 (1976).
31. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 30.

Epstein elaborates this point with his "urn" analogy. Supposing a
worker's search for a suitable employer is like retrieving balls from
an urn - each ball containing a number corresponding to the desirability of the job - Epstein considers "the prospects of two workers,
one who can draw balls from either urn, and one who knows that she
is confined to the urn that contains only a tenth as many balls as the
other."' 32 He reasons: "[I]f the variations in both original distributions are about the same, then the difference between the highest
numbers in each urn is apt to be small, even if the majority of the
'33
desirable balls are in the larger urn."
Putting other potential issues aside, 34 let us focus only on one narrow economic point Epstein himself later raises: the existence of imperfect information. Epstein admits that his above urn analogy has
implicitly
assumed that a search for either employer or employee was costless in that
one could look at all the balls in the urn individually before deciding which
one to choose. A more realistic model assumes that in each and every case
there is some cost to inspecting any ball taken from the urn. Job applicants
must spend time filling out forms, attending interviews, providing references, and taking tests . . . . With an offer in hand, a worker will seek
another only if the anticipated wage increase is greater than the costs incurred to procure it.3s

Indeed, transaction costs in the labor market play a key role in Epstein's argument in a number of places, in particular, being the foundation of his modification to Gary Becker's theory of
discrimination.36 Having raised this real world complication in the
above passage, however, Epstein immediately begins describing how
markets act to minimize such transaction costs, as "headhunters"
32. Id. at 32.
33. Id.
34. We might ask Epstein, for example, in what sense the likely difference in the
best offer in each urn will be "small." Certainly the differences will be "small" compared
to the differences between the best and worst jobs within either urn. But for many occupations, people do not consider the difference between, for example, the best and third
best available jobs to be "small." Second, we might ask how often the less-than-probable
case will arise in which the differences are by any measure "large." Occasionally, for
example, even a random sampling of 10% will produce jobs that are all below average.
(That some samplings produce only above average jobs is irrelevant since one can only
take one job.) Third, given that one factor that makes one job better than another is the
opportunity it provides for acquiring human capital and advancing to even better jobs,
one might wonder what the consequences of even small job differences may be over a
worker's lifetime.
35. Id. at 37.
36. Id. at 76-77 ("discrimination has survival value which is apt to be missed if
firm behavior is modeled on the more traditional, pre-Coasean pattern of homogeneous
actors in a world of zero transaction costs"). More generally, Epstein notes: "The marginal costs of search are critical to the decision of how long to look after a qualified candidate appears. If these costs are low, then the next look may be worth taking. But if they
are high, then it may not." Id. at 179; see also id. at 231 ("Internal to the firm, labor is
not impersonal, and transaction costs are always positive.").
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and "hiring fairs" do in labor markets.3 7 In the pages following, Epstein argues that search costs do not cause or permit discrimination.3 8 Curiously, however, it is not clear what argument Epstein is
seeking to refute. These pages hint at the existence of an argument
that because of search costs, discrimination harms its victims, but it
is an argument Epstein never actually explains.3 9
How does the presence of search costs affect Epstein's example in
which ninety percent of employers will not hire people of a certain
race? Epstein's claim that discrimination victims suffer no significant
harm works if, but only if, the worker has perfect information about
precisely which ten percent of employers will hire people of her race
or gender. To the extent the worker's information is less than perfect, the worker necessarily has higher search costs as a result of the
discrimination. If, for example, the worker has no advance information about which employers discriminate, the target of discrimination
in Epstein's example would on average need to investigate ten potential employers to find one who will even consider offering a job (compared to those not suffering from discrimination, for whom every
employer will consider offering a job). The existence of discrimination thus raises the cost of finding a ball with any number on it by a
factor of ten. With fewer discriminators or more information, this
factor obviously declines, but with any information imperfection, dis40
crimination raises the costs to some degree.
Search costs in turn affect the bargaining between employer and
worker. Epstein's analysis bypasses the bargaining process, as if the
job package (salary, benefits, prospects for advancement, etc.) was
always a fixed offer for the worker to take or leave. But parties will
bargain based on their "reservation" prices: the most the employer is
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 38-41.
39. Epstein does briefly describe the argument of Paul Milgrom and Sharon Oster,
Job Discriminations, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis, 102 QUART. J.
ECON. 453 (1987). FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 38-39. That article, however,
is confined to the problem of discrimination in promotions, discussing not the general
problem of search costs I outline in the text, but a special problem they term "invisibility." Even when a worker locates nondiscriminatory employers with suitable job openings, there may be high costs in overcoming the invisibility of one's abilities, i.e.,
convincing potential employers of one's above-average productivity. See also infra note
43.
40. See, e.g., James J. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, The Urban Institute Audit
Studies: Their Methods and Findings, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 193 (1992) ("These [discrimination] figures
[from the Urban Institute Washington study] imply that blacks would have to sample
about 50 percent more jobs than whites to get an offer.").

willing to pay and the least the worker is willing to accept. If the
worker's reservation price is lower than the employer's, then the parties may bargain to a solution somewhere in between. The effect of
higher search costs, however, is to lower the worker's reservation
price. Recall Epstein's statement that "[w]ith an offer in hand, a
worker will seek another only if the anticipated wage increase is
greater than the costs incurred to procure it."41 In other words, the
worker will accept Offer One if it exceeds the amount: (Expected
Offer Two minus Expected Search Costs). Consequently, the higher
the Expected Search Costs, the lower Offer One need be to induce
the worker to accept. And unfortunately for the discrimination victim, a nondiscriminatory employer will likely be familiar with the
pervasiveness of discrimination, reason that the worker has a lower
reservation price, and make a lower final offer.42 Thus, contrary to
Epstein's claim, the opportunities lost affect the opportunities
retained.
The effect of search costs is especially powerful if the worker is
initially unemployed; part of the "search cost" is the disutility of
living without income. I take Epstein's argument that search costs
are usually low to apply to those workers already employed. Once a
job is accepted, however, there are often costs associated with quitting and moving to a new employer. Moreover, there are new search
costs: (i) a higher value of one's scarcer leisure time used for the
search, and (ii) the risk that an employer will invest less in training
workers she believes are actively searching for other employment. In
a law firm, for example, if an associate is suspected to be looking
elsewhere for employment, she is less likely to be assigned the scarce
kind of work on which one gains experience indispensable to advancement. These latter two costs will be greater for a discrimination victim who has to search more to find a nondiscriminatory
employer.
Epstein might respond to these search cost problems 3 by pointing
41. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 37.
42. Cf. Heckman & Siegelman, supra note 40, at 193; George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-based Wages Among Tradition-oriented,Stochastically Trading
Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265, 274 (1985).
43. I do not think Epstein's criticism of Milgrom and Oster's "invisibility" argument is responsive to the general concerns I raise concerning search costs. See supra note
39. In response to their theory explaining how unpromoted workers could be paid less
than their productivity, Epstein says underpaid workers would intentionally decrease
their productivity, "tak[ing] out in leisure what she cannot obtain in higher wages."
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 39. Whatever the merit of the argument in attacking the "invisibility" theory, such a strategy fails to solve the general problem of
search costs. The employer would respond to decreases in productivity by further decreases in wages; the employer can afford to underpay by the amount of expected search
costs (not to mention that "slacking off" would likely make it harder to convince other
potential employers of one's value). Epstein also says that information costs show that
the law should not restrict information on which employers rely. Id. at 40. He apparently
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out that in a world without Title VII, discriminatory firms would be
free to state their discriminatory preferences, e.g., to advertise for
"white males only." Such disclosures would provide free information,
saving search costs, potentially to the point where the costs for discrimination targets and non-targets were equal. But there is no reason to believe that after repealing Title VII, more than a small
percentage of discriminating firms would actually advertise their discrimination. Certainly before Title VII, many discriminatory enterprises did not advertise their racial and gender requirements. Today,
those who openly discriminate risk social and economic sanctions
from a segment of society, so it is likely that most of those who discriminate after repeal of Title VII would try to do so with some
discretion. Second, most discriminators today probably do not wish
to exclude all racial minorities or women, but rather to impose different standards on different groups, making sure that any minority
or woman worker is "the right kind," in contrast to the stereotype
the discriminator holds of their group. If so, the employer will genuinely not wish to advertise "white males only," and I doubt many
will advertise their more complex racial and gender requirements.44
Finally, by revealing its special needs, a firm that advertises its desire for a particular racial and gender group will weaken its bargaining position with potential employees who belong to the desired
group.4 5
In short, the fact - not the extent - of transaction costs in the
labor market means that the presence of discriminatory employers
will harm the victims of discrimination. How much discrimination
harms its victims in a competitive market is sensitive to precisely
how far the market goes in reducing search costs. Now we see why
Epstein never expressly states why search costs matter. All that he
means this to criticize disparate impact analysis, but it does not support his general claim
that workers are not injured by refusals-to-deal.
44. The complexity of discriminatory desires in turn raises job search costs. Some
employers may discriminate only in promotion to certain ranks, which means that a
worker cannot assume from the existence of a job offer that the firm is nondiscriminatory. With discrimination, ascertaining prospects for promotion is more costly.
45. Firms have search costs too. To paraphrase Epstein, given one available
worker, an employer will seek another only if the anticipated wage decrease (or productivity increase) is greater than the search costs incurred to procure it. FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 37. Because a firm seeking a racial or ethnic subset of all
available workers will have higher search costs than nondiscriminatory firms, the former
firms will be willing to pay acceptable candidates more than the latter ones. If firms
advertise their racial and ethnic specifications, they will reveal their higher reservation
price and weaken their bargaining position. I would like to thank Pam Karlan for suggesting this point.

can demonstrate is that those costs are made "smaller" by market
forces, not that they are too small to cause harm to discrimination
victims.46 His argument that worker welfare depends on opportunities retained, not opportunities lost, is therefore contingent on the
untidy and uncertain fact of how much search cost remains. And
here is the crux of the matter: markets work to lower all transaction
costs. Given Epstein's belief that search costs nonetheless have important consequences in other contexts, 4 his conclusory judgment
that "[t]he effort . . . to find [within such costs] any persistent
large-scale source of discrimination should fail,"' 48 is hardly proof

that such an effort will fail, or an excuse for not making the effort at
all. The size and effect of search costs remains a thorny empirical
question -

a "hard question" -

even within Epstein's chosen

method of argument.
III. SOCIAL NORMS
There are places in the argument of Forbidden Grounds where
Epstein considers how empirical evidence bears on his claim. To his
credit, Epstein sometimes considers economic data adverse to his
thesis, as for example, evidence of significant discrimination in competitive markets and evidence of the effectiveness of Title VII in
raising the wages of black workers. Epstein subjects these studies to
extended methodological scrutiny, however, and finds them wanting. 49 His methodological criticisms and reinterpretations of these

studies have already generated substantial and, in my view, compelling responses. 50 My concern here, however, is Epstein's failure to
46. As James Lindgren has noted in discussing job searches, "whether the transaction costs are low or minimal in any absolute sense is largely irrelevant." James
Lindgren, "Ol' Man River . . . He Keeps on Rollin' Along". A Reply to Donohue's

Diverting the Coasean River, 78 GEo. L.J. 577, 583 (1990). What matters is the size of
the search costs in relation to the incremental advantage of the next job offer the search
produces.
47.

See supra note 36.

48. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 40.
49. Concerning how much discrimination exists in competitive markets, Epstein
cites no empirical study showing the absence or insignificance of discrimination, but
selects three studies with contrary results and criticizes their methodology at length. Id.
at 47-58. Later Epstein states that "[t]here has been a rash of detailed investigations of
the effects of the Civil Rights Act" which tend to show improvement in the wages of
blacks from 1965 to 1975. Id. at 243-44. He then selects one such study and argues that
its data do not support its conclusion attributing these results to Title VII's prohibition of
private discrimination (as opposed to its effect of eliminating state laws requiring discrimination). Id. at 244-51 (citing James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining
the Impact of Federal AntidiscriminationPolicy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A
Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138 (1989)).

50. Ian Ayres responds to Epstein's criticism of his findings of discrimination in
the automobile market in Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination
Analysis in Other Market Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 67 (1994) (responding to
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 51-54). J. Hoult Verkerke and John Donohue
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apply the same kind of scrutiny to empirical data supporting his thesis as he does to empirical data contradicting it. A good example is

his discussion of social norms. After setting forth his economic thesis
that market competition will eliminate all undesirable forms of
discrimination - Epstein himself raises the claim that social norms
of discrimination may be resistant to market pressure. Related is the

historic argument that Jim Crow segregation did not depend in entirety on legal sanctions - as Epstein contends - but rested in significant part on custom and "informal codes."
Epstein makes several responses to these claims. He points out

that Jim Crow segregation was sustained not merely by specific laws
mandating particular forms of discrimination, but by the more gen-

eral control whites had over governmental power: "the ballot, the
police force, the courts, and the other instruments of state domina-

tion."51 In addition, the white majority wielded the threat of private
52

violence against those who threatened the discriminatory norm.

Absent this violence and the white monopoly on state power, "new
entry can take place by firms willing to cater to blacks in all segments of the economy. The tighter the social cartel against blacks
under Jim Crow, the larger the returns to new entry in the market-

place, notwithstanding a social consensus in the opposite direction." 53 This point is crucial to Epstein's overall thesis; only if social
norms are excluded as an explanatory force can Epstein infer,
merely from the absence of "new entry" into the South prior to
1964, that the cause was covert governmental opposition. 4

Yet Epstein's a priori assertions are not enough to resolve the issue
in his favor. Although it was not possible for the South to maintain
respond to Epstein's reinterpretation of Heckman and Payner's study, supra note 49, of
the effects of Title VII on black wages. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, 105
HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2090-91 (1992) (reviewing FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1);
John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1594-96 (1992) (reviewing FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 1).
51. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 97.
52. Id. at 96-97. Epstein notes that violence was effective because of "the willingness of law enforcement officials to turn a blind eye to its prosecution, or indeed to participate in it." Id. at 97.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 127 ("The dog that did not bark gives the best evidence of pervasive
government involvement in this area."); see also id. at 251. The silent dog is certainly
the "best evidence" Epstein has found, for, as Ian Ayres has pointed out, Epstein cites
not one example of a local government abusing its police powers to deter investment by
outside entrepreneurs. Ian Ayres, Price and Prejudice, NEW REPUBLIC, July 6, 1992, at

30, 31 (reviewing

FORBIDDEN- GROUNDS,

supra note 1). The inference thus works only if

social norms cannot explain the same result.

the same magnitude of discrimination absent pervasive restraints on
black political power, it is a different question whether market competition would eliminate or even nearly eliminate discrimination
"notwithstanding a social consensus in the opposite direction."' 5 And
it is not a question that can be resolved without reference to empirical data. Epstein, for example, appears to concede that Title VII was
initially justified as a "jolt" to the system of violence that prevented
free contractual exchange, yet his argument for repeal implicitly
makes the empirical claim that Title VII is no longer necessary to
overcome such violence today.58 One can easily imagine why Title
VII might remain necessary: Even with unbiased law enforcement, it
is rarely possible to deter all violence or threats of violence, especially if they have some popular support. 57 Even a low risk of violence posed by only a few bigots will diminish the "returns to new
entry" and cause firms to forego some otherwise profitable business
that a norm prohibits.58 Without violence, it is still plausible that
people care enough about their standing in their community that
they would regard the social ostracism and scorn as a high cost to
violating norms.
These possibilities again raise messy empirical issues. But, here,
Epstein is prepared to argue on empirical grounds. Epstein concludes
his discussion of norms with the following:
55.

FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note

1, at 97.

56. See id. at 142, 252. Epstein's point is that Title VII is only justified as a "jolt"
to the system of violence, but "when the system returns to a steady state, that justification ceases .... It does not provide any justification for the statute in a 'first-best'
world without prior official and private abuse." Id. at 142. But given Epstein's concession
that the "first-best" world he describes never existed, the question simply becomes
whether we have yet reached the "steady state" to which he refers, i.e., whether in the
absence of Title VII, violence would reemerge as a threat to nondiscriminators. Epstein is
careful not to suggest, however, that the attitudes underlying racial violence have improved markedly since 1964, lest he give support to the idea that the Civil Rights Act
helped bring about such an attitude change, desirably shaping people's preferences - an
idea he abhors. See id. at 273-74, 304-06.
57. Popular support for a crime makes law enforcement more difficult both because there are more potential suspects and less cooperative witnesses. As an example,
consider the success of a small number of violent anti-abortion actors in restraining the
market for abortion services, especially in areas where the actors receive some sympathy.
See Dan Baum, Violence is Driving Away Rural Abortion Providers, Cm. TRIB., Aug.
21, 1993, at 1; Donohue, supra note 50, at 1610 n.126. More pointedly, consider the
success of anonymous threats in keeping Vidor, Texas entirely white. See Hate Prevails:

Blacks Leave Town,

CHI. TRIB.,

Sept. 10, 1993, at 10.

58. Title VII, on the other hand, helps solve the problem of violence by imposing a
serious threat on the opposite side of the balance. It is more difficult to coerce people into
a particular course of conduct when they face other threats if they engage in that very
course of conduct. Title VII thus undermines the effectiveness of low risks of violence.
(Because there are much greater costs associated with maintaining a credible threat at
higher levels - the likelihood of apprehension and serious punishment increases - conventional criminal sanctions may deter high level violent threats). This effect constitutes
the "jolt" Epstein acknowledges.
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J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato have demonstrated in the Japanese context that these community norms are fragile in the sense that a
single outsider who has little to fear from ostracism can undermine them by
going to court. Once the first party has left the fold, then others will find it
more easy to follow. Japan is regarded as a closed society, perhaps even
more so than the Old South. If the single marginal entrant can change the
social balance of power in the one case, then it can do so in the other.59

At first, Epstein's claim may seem peculiar. One might think the
best way to resolve the power of discriminatory social norms in the
United States would be to consider studies of discriminatory social
norms in the United States. 0 Instead, Epstein offers a study of Japanese norms against litigation. Nonetheless, such a study is relevant if
it is sufficient to show as a generalproposition that social norms are
fragile. And this seems to be Epstein's claim: the particular study of
Japanese litigation norms shows that American discriminatory
norms are fragile and ineffective because it shows that all social
norms are fragile and ineffective.6 '
59.

FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,

supra note 1, at 97 (footnote omitted) (citing J. Mark

Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Ver-

dict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL

STUD.

263, 286-87 (1989)).

60. Given, for example, Epstein's claim that it was the "hostile laws [that] made
the South a less attractive place for new entrants from outside the region who might
otherwise have made substantial business from doing business with local blacks," FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 96 (emphasis added), he might have consulted and
responded to such classics as GUNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944) or JOHN
DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (3d ed. 1957), which give normbased explanations for why whites, including transplanted northerners, failed to act
against social consensus:
When [northerners] come down South ... they usually accept the social arrangements and become loyal white-caste members. A number of cases of this
were pointed out, especially those of northerners who had come to do business
in the South ....
It seemed very likely that [such a person] had to accept
southern views because his social contacts and those of his wife and family
were with whites; he could not stand out against the tremendous pressure of
white sentiment; and further, he could advance his economic interests only by
cooperating with the dominant group.
DOLLARD, supra, at 47-48. Private social and economic ostracism were an effective sanction; as Dollard later states: "If one lives in Southerntown, 'not to be received' is a very
serious matter and would be more so if one's family were there; living would be quite
intolerable without opportunity for friendly contacts within the white caste." Id. at 354.
Contrary to Epstein's claim that "the single outsider" can unravel a social norm, Dollard
reports powerful norms despite one wealthy "Yankee" in Southerntown who "defied
southern customs at many points." Id. at 47.
61. Verkerke, while offering similar criticism, more charitably reads Epstein as offering two empirical studies on the power of the market "to break down the segregated
system." Verkerke, supra note 50, at 2090. Perhaps I am being miserly but I do not
count Epstein's citation to Price V. Fishback, Can Competition among Employers Reduce Governmental Discrimination? Coal Companies and Segregated Schools in West
Virginia in the Early 1900s, 32 J. L. & ECON. 311 (1989), as evidence that social norms
are fragile. Fishback shows that during a "coal boom" mining companies raised wages

The brevity in which Epstein makes this sweeping claim is, if one
does not miss it entirely, nothing short of breathtaking. The existence and power of social norms is a rich subject representing a fault
line between the social sciences: sociology viewing norms as an important mechanism of social control, economics being more skeptical
about apparently nonmaterial and/or nonselfish explanations of behavior.62 Whether discrimination can exist in a competitive labor
market would appear to depend, in Epstein's mode of argument, on
how the debate is resolved. But given the depth of the issue, it is
rather unsatisfying to be told only that two scholars "have demonstrated" that social norms are impotent. One must wonder how Epstein would respond if a Title VII proponent cavalierly cited a single
study (published, no less, in a sociologically-inclined journal then edited by the proponent herself) "demonstrating" the empirical invalidity of price theory or some other central tenet of economic
analysis.
Even if Epstein thinks it unnecessary to survey the opposing data
before dismissing the ability of social norms to shape behavior, he
should have at least addressed two legal sources supporting the
power of social norms. First is Epstein himself, specifically his claim
about "informal enforcement" of promises in his chapter Rational
Discrimination in Competitive Markets. 3 Epstein there says that

for blacks and successfully pressured West Virginia to improve black education as a
means of attracting black labor. As Verkerke points out, however, because the coal companies had uncommon "difficulty attracting sufficient white labor," the example represents "the most favorable possible conditions for the elimination of segregation," and yet
the coal companies still excluded blacks from jobs supervising whites. Verkerke, supra
note 50, at 2093; see Fishback, supra, at 315 n. 11. Merely showing that social norms do
not fully explain behavior - that material interests sometimes cause people to violate
norms - does not show that one can fully explain behavior without resort to social
norms. Unlike the study discussed in the text - which makes such a claim - Fishback
simply does not explicitly discuss norms at all.
62. Epstein's only allusion to the literature on social norms is in a footnote where
he states that Ramseyer's and Nakazato's "particular targets are the social anthropologists, such as Marshall Sablins." FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1,at 97 n.15. For
examples of the sociological literature, see WILLIAM J. GOODE, THE CELEBRATION OF
HEROES: PRESTIGE AS A CONTROL SYSTEM (1978); MICHAEL HECHTER, PRINCIPLES OF
GROUP SOLIDARITY (1987); 1 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL: FUNDAMENTALS (Donald Black ed., 1984); 2 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL: SELECTED PROBLEMS (Donald Black ed., 1984); for a psychological discussion, see
Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A TheoreticalRefinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, 24 ADVANCES IN
ExP. Soc. Psy. 201 (1991). Examples of philosophical treatments of norms are JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 97-151 (1989); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977). Economic work on norms
includes ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) and GEORGE A.
AKERLOF, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES (1984).
63. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 59-78.
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firms seek to draw workers from one ethnic or racial group to maximize the effectiveness of informal enforcement because
[t]he party who cheats at work now knows that he faces stricter sanctions,
given the strong likelihood that the information will be brought home to
him at play, at church, or in other business and social settings. The complex
networks of human interactions thus induces persons to honor their deals."4

Perhaps Epstein only meant to say that once a party is known as a

"cheater" within his own network, people will fear being cheated
and engage in fewer business deals with him. This much may even
suffice for the point Epstein is making in this Chapter, but his ex-

press reference to sanctions "at play [and] at church" suggests, in

addition, that people will no longer wish to socialize or worship with
someone who cheats, that is, with someone who violates their group

norm against cheating. Of course, to invoke this cost of cheating
contradicts Epstein's attack on norms.

5

But the actual force of so-

cial norms is so common-sensical that Epstein cannot help but appeal to them in this context.

Aside from resolving such inconsistencies, the one source Epstein
might have been expected to address -

Ramseyer-Nakazato study -

for reasons internal to the

is the work of legal scholar Robert

Ellickson. Ellickson has sought to bridge the gap between "law and

economics" and "law and society" with an economic analysis of social norms.6 6 A comparison of Ramseyer and Nakazato with Ellickson is worthwhile for two reasons. First, Ramseyer and Nakazato
studied the effect of social norms on disputes between strangers;although Epstein does not mention it, they expressly qualify their results as applying only to such disputes, expressly contrasting the

work of Ellickson 7 This distinction is vital to any attempt to apply
the study to social norms of discrimination, since those norms
are at
68

least partly enforced between people who know each other.

64. Id. at 70.
65. If "a single outsider who has little to fear from ostracism" can completely
undermine the norm against litigation, the single outsider could also undermine the norm
against cheating. If there were no norm against cheating, there would be no reason for
people to ostracize cheaters in (at least, noncompetitive) play or at church.
66. See ELUCKSON, supra note 62.
67. Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 59, at 265 n.6, (citing Robert C. Ellickson,
A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEG. STUD.
67 (1987); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986)). Epstein himself discusses the
latter work in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 547-48 (5th ed.
1990).
68. Discriminatory norms may be enforced within clusters of people with social
and economic ties, such as one's family, friends, neighbors, church members, co-workers,

Second, the particular disputes Ramseyer and Nakazato study
(not described in Forbidden Grounds) are automobile accident cases
involving a fatality. Ellickson's own empirical work concerns how
residents of Shasta County, California resolve three kinds of disputes
involving livestock: (i) damages to property caused by cattle-trespass, (ii) allocation of the costs of boundary fences, and (iii) damages from automobile accidents caused by livestock wandering onto
highways. While Ellickson found that social norms dominated resolution of the first two kinds of disputes, legal rules and litigation did
control the third. Ellickson says that because (i) the parties to the
automobile accident are usually strangers to each other and to each
other's community, (ii) the stakes are quite high, and (iii) third
party insurers are always involved, social norms are less powerful
than legal rules. 69 Thus, the decision to file suit for injuries arising
out of an automobile accident - despite norms to the contrary - is
Ellickson's own example of one instance in which social norms fail,
in contrast to other contexts where norms predominate; they hardly
serve as proof that social norms generally have no significance. For
the broad point he is asserting, Epstein could not have selected a
more inapposite example.
Even with respect to norms among strangers, Ramseyer and
Nakazato make an important theoretical limitation to their claim
that social norms are fragile. They do claim generally that social
norms persuade individuals only when they are widely followed.
They then reason, as Epstein suggests, that "outsiders on the social
margin" who are immune to ostracism "can corrode the entire normative order" by violating the social norm. But they also state:
"Where outsiders form a distinct ethnic group, of course, insiders in
many societies have been able to contain their corrosive effect by
defining them as categorically 'other.' In ethnically more'1 homoge0
nous societies like Japan, these tactics often do not work.
Ramseyer and Nakazato appear to believe that ethnic vilification
is an effective means of maintaining significant social norms in heterogeneous societies. The idea seems to be that after "defining" the
ethnic minority as "other," their noncompliance with norms is attributed to their inferiority rather than to the falsity of the norm. At a
minimum the claim suggests an interesting and complex motivation
for systemic discrimination against ethnic minorities - symbolic

local merchants, etc.
69. ELLICKSON, supra note 62, at 94-95.
70. Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 59, at 287 (emphasis added).
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subordination of minorities assists the majority in maintaining its social norms"' - a motivation Epstein neither mentions nor explores.
Moreover, the claim raises at least the possibility that Ramseyer and
Nakazato think that the operative mechanism for causing discrimination is a social norm "defining" the minority as "other." I cannot
imagine how one group "defines" another without some costly, cooperative behavior among members of the group doing the defining. In
an article devoted to diminishing the significance of social norms, I
would have expected the authors to say so if they believed the mechanism of "definition" was exclusively state, as opposed to private,
action. Thus, notwithstanding their general views on social norms, I
read Ramseyer and Nakazato as implying either that "many societies" have obtained full participation by the dominant ethnic group,
or that less than full participation can effectively sustain a discriminatory norm. I expect Epstein reads the passage differently, but
given the importance of this article to his dismissal of norms, he
owed his readers a more thorough and candid discussion of it.
The point - again - is not that Epstein's beliefs about social
norms are wholly untenable. Rather, given the extended methodological scrutiny Epstein provides studies that run contrary to his general
point, one might also have expected an examination of the methodology of studies, like this one, that he claims as support for his
argument.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the three claims considered above are each important to
the argument of Forbidden Grounds, I do not claim that my brief
criticism is sufficient, by itself, to disprove Epstein's overall thesis.
Instead, I have sought only to illustrate what I view as the general
weakness of the work: that Epstein's urge to deal Title VII a devastating blow overwhelms his need to admit complexity or difficulty in
measuring the consequences of the statute. Given the scope of Forbidden Grounds, three examples are perhaps too few to establish
71.

See, e.g., KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOL64 (1966) ("One of the surest ways to confirm an identity, for communities as well as for individuals, is to find a way of measuring what one is not.").
Recall that Ramseyer and Nakazato state that "[i]n ethnically more homogenous societies like Japan, these tactics often do not work." Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 59,
at 287. Thus, in contrast to Epstein's inference that social norms should work more effecOGY OF DEVIANCE

tively in a "closed society" like Japan than in the Old South,

FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,

supra note 1, at 97, the study suggests that social norms should be generally less effective
in Japan than in a more heterogenous society like the bi-racial "Old South."

even this claim. But consider the similarity among the examples:
concerning Hobbes, Epstein utterly ignores a competing claim from
the source on whom he relies; concerning transaction costs, he responds to a competing claim that he never adequately describes, thus
obscuring the weakness in his response; concerning social norms, he
fully states the competing claim but then purports to disprove it by a
grossly incomplete and unbalanced reference to empirical literature
on the issue. There is, in my view, a disturbing pattern here, one in
which the impulse to advocate has undermined the commitment to
scholarly principles of candor and objectivity.
Epstein's book has understandably generated much controversy.
Those of us who are unpersuaded by his argument should nevertheless applaud him (and others on the left and right) for challenging
cherished beliefs and conventional wisdom, an essential part of what
scholars are supposed to do. But it would be quite wrong to attribute
all objections to this work to the failure to tolerate such challenges.
The negative reaction also arises from the kind of failings I and
others have documented; this scholarly criticism is richly deserved.

